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Pascrell, Congressional Homeland Security Leaders Question Security At Newark Airport

U.S. Rep. Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ-08) joined U.S. Rep. Bennie Thompson, the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security and U.S. Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, the Chairwoman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection in sending a letter to the  Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in regards to a series of security lapses and Newark Liberty International Airport.

The text of the letter is attached below;

February 1, 2007

The Honorable Edmund S. Hawley
Assistant Secretary
Transportation Security Administration
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202

RE:  Newark Liberty International Airport

Dear Assistant Secretary Hawley:

 Given our shared interest that the highest level of integrity exist throughout all the activities of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), we are writing to express our serious concerns about recent allegations made in a series of articles in The Star-Ledger, about the Newark Liberty International Airport.  We would like some information to resolve three troubling issues raised in the articles and ensure the effective and efficient operation of aviation security at Newark Airport.

First, we are troubled to learn in an article entitled “News Leak on Security Tests Spurs Airport Interrogations,” that Newark airport personnel, including Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) were interrogated by the Federal agents who were investigating the source of leaked tests results that reflected poor performance by the Newark screening staff in October 2006.  The test results were reported in The Star-Ledger on October 27, 2006, and showed failure by TSA screeners in 20 of 22 tests, as well as violations of standard operating procedures.  While we appreciate that this information was labeled by TSA as “security sensitive information” (SSI) and the unauthorized release of SSI information is a violation of law, we are troubled that staff at Newark feel that there is more interest in hunting down the leaker than addressing an abysmally high failure rate in the screener testing.  Please provide information about what action was taken to identify the causes for the poor performance.  Specifically, please respond to the following questions:

• Have you been able to determine the causes for the poor performance at Newark?

• If so, how much of the performance problems are attributable to gaps in training and how much of the problem is attributable to limitations in technology?

• What are TSA’s policies and protocols when the screeners at an airport perform poorly in covert tests?

• Were those policies and protocols followed at Newark?

• Have subsequent covert tests at Newark indicated any changes in the level of performance?

Secondly, we were troubled to read recently that Marcus Arroyo, the Newark Federal Security Director who was replaced on March 9, 2006 in the wake of series of security lapses at the airport continued to draw his $156,752 federal salary until early January 2007 (“TSA Chief at Airport Paid After His Ouster – Arroyo Kept Getting Salary for 10 Months,” The Star-Ledger, January 19, 2007).  In the piece, noted expert of the Federal workforce, Paul Light, stated that “paying a healthy federal employee for nearly 10 months when that person is not on the job ‘is not common at all’ and ‘raises questions of appearance’ for the TSA.”  We agree.  These payments are reminiscent of a private sector practice of forcing out a wayward executive and handing him a “golden parachute.” This suspicion is further bolstered by TSA’s statement in the article that Arroyo had not accepted any new assignments or performed any duties for the TSA in the six months after his departure.  This matter presents the following questions:

• What was Mr. Arroyo’s job title, responsibilities and salary immediately after being removed from the FSD role at Newark in March 2006?

• Was Mr. Arroyo reassigned to another position or agency, prior to filing his retirement papers effective Jan 3, 2007?

• If he was not reassigned, did TSA continue to view him as an employee after March 2006?  Does TSA still view Mr. Arroyo as an employee?  If so, what is his title, responsibilities and salary?

• Did Mr. Arroyo have 10 months worth of annual or other leave to remain on the payroll for this extended amount of time?

• If he did not have enough accumulated leave, why did Mr. Arroyo continue to receive a salary?

Finally, we learned in a January 21, 2007 piece, entitled “Airport Security Official Quits after Leaked Test,” that test material contained in an exam to be administered to persons seeking open screener manager jobs was leaked in advance to some applicants.  TSA officials allegedly stated to the The Star-Ledger that Gerard A. Grandinetti, the Assistant Federal Security Director in charge of screening at the airport was under investigation as part of the inquiry into the unauthorized distribution of the test questions.  In light of these allegations, we would like to know whether you have confidence that managers at Newark are of the best quality and can perform as required.  Additionally, we would like to know what, if any, changes have you made to the testing procedures to address the weaknesses brought to light in this case?

In conclusion, we are writing because we believe that the problems raised in Newark are illustrative of some significant areas of dysfunction at TSA that undermine aviation security.  The first instance brings to the fore the difficulties screeners have in coming forward to expose gaps in security and the absence of Federal whistleblower protections. The second instance, the appearance of a golden parachute for a senior level person who was removed for performance issues, seems to raise fundamental questions about how TSA manages its workforce.  The third instance raises the disturbing prospect  that cheating was undertaken to ensure that staff favored by management, regardless of merit, were advanced up the career ladder over more deserving employees.

Please direct any follow up questions you may have on this request to Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Democratic Staff Director and General Counsel of the Committee on Homeland Security, at (202) 226-2616.

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